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 ARCTIC
 VOL 51, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1998) P. 262-279
 Justifying Public Decisions in Arctic Oil and Gas Development:
 American and Russian Approaches
 NICHOLAS E. FLANDERS,1 REX V. BROWN,2 YELENA ANDRE'EVA3 and OLEG LARICHEV3
 (Received 28 February 1997; accepted in revised form 29 January 1998)
 ABSTRACT. Government resource decisions in the Arctic typically involve complex issues; multiple criteria are used to choose
 among alternatives. This complexity is even greater with petroleum development because of concerns about national energy
 security, environmental impacts, and economic development. Two decision-aiding techniques may help decision makers clarify
 their decisions to themselves, the stakeholders, and the general public. The Russian qualitative technique seeks to reduce the
 number of criteria and find alternative options that may be better than the initial ones. The Western quantitative technique seeks
 to measure the decision maker* s judgement about the utility and certainty of each option. These techniques are applied to two case
 studies: a decision about gas pipeline routing on the Yamal Peninsula, Russia, and a tool for evaluating applications for
 development permits on the North Slope of Alaska. The qualitative method is easier to use and may be the best model for people
 who use numbers infrequently or want to make a claim based on rights. The quantitative method did well at preserving detail and
 incorporating uncertainty. Both approaches helped to reduce the apparent complexity of the decisions.
 Key words: oil and gas, decision analysis, Yamal Peninsula, Badami, Niakuk
 RÉSUMÉ. Les décisions gouvernementales concernant les ressources dans l'Arctique mettent le plus souvent enjeu des questions
 complexes; un grand nombre de critères sont utilisés en vue de choisir parmi différentes options. Cette complexité s'accroît dans
 le cas de l'exploitation pétrolière en raison des problèmes entourant la sécurité nationale de l'énergie, les retombées environnementales
 et le développement économique. Deux techniques d' aide à la décision peuvent inciter les décideurs à clarifier leurs décisions pour
 eux-mêmes, pour les parties intéressées et pour le grand public. La technique qualitative russe cherche à réduire le nombre de
 critères et à trouver des solutions de rechange qui pourraient être meilleures que les mesures initiales. La technique quantitative
 occidentale cherche à mesurer le jugement du décideur sur l'utilité et la certitude de chaque option. Ces techniques sont appliquées
 à deux études de cas: une décision concernant le tracé d'un gazoduc dans la presqu'île de Iamal en Russie, et un outil permettant
 d'évaluer les demandes de permis d'exploitation sur le versant Nord de l'Alaska. La méthode qualitative est plus facile à utiliser
 et peut être le meilleur modèle pour des individus qui n'ont pas l'habitude des chiffres ou qui veulent établir une revendication
 fondée sur des droits. La méthode quantitative réussit bien à préserver le détail et à intégrer l'incertitude. Les deux approches
 aidaient à réduire la complexité apparente des décisions.
 Mots clés: pétrole et gaz, analyse des décisions, presqu'île Iamal, Badami, Niakuk
 Traduit pour la revue Arctic par Nésida Loyer.
 INTRODUCTION
 The world's desire for oil and gas has led to the exploration
 and development of fields in the remote corners of the earth.
 The importance to developed economies of petroleum for
 transportation, electrical generation, and temperature control
 has made supervision of these resources matters of national
 and international security. However, development has proved
 controversial in areas where the natural environment is con-
 sidered particularly valuable or vulnerable.
 The development of petroleum fields in the Arctic is a case
 in point. The world-class discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil
 field in Alaska should have been followed by immediate
 development and operation. Instead, a nascent environmental
 movement held up exploitation for several years. Only the
 Arab oil boycott in 1974 convinced the United States Con-
 gress to remove all environmental roadblocks and allow the
 construction of the Trans- Alaska Pipeline System. In Russia,
 the central government has decided to develop gas fields on
 the Yamal Peninsula because of a national need for foreign
 exchange. This decision was made despite an expert commis-
 sion report that raised serious environmental and indigenous
 rights concerns.
 Whether to develop new fields in the Arctic, and under
 what conditions, has become a national and international
 issue. The terms of this debate involve complex concerns tied
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 up with multiple factors that must be taken into account. A
 clear-cut answer rarely emerges even when "the national
 interest" is considered paramount. A major difficulty derives
 precisely from defining what the national interest is. This
 complexity is true of many environmental debates, but be-
 comes most obvious when, as in the Arctic, the issue pits
 fundamental needs of the economy and society, such as
 transportation, against fundamental symbols of environmen-
 tal purity, such as the sparsely inhabited polar regions.
 The Need for a Reviewable Rationale
 The need for a reviewable rationale now exists in both
 Russia and the United States. The need in the United States
 has existed since at least the passage of the National Environ-
 mental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Alaska was the site of
 perhaps the first environmental impact review, which pre-
 dated NEPA by almost a decade (O'Neill, 1994). NEPA, as
 well as several acts that have followed, requires a multi-
 agency and public review of the environmental impacts of a
 proposed federal action. Single agencies continue to make
 decisions about those actions, but they must explain their
 preference and fully answer objections put forth by other
 agencies and the public.
 In Russia, the situation is now similar. In Soviet times,
 many Arctic problems were declared "secret" for military
 reasons. Central ministries were the dominant decision mak-
 ers. Now, the government must explain decisions about
 Arctic resources to the general population and active groups.
 The decisions must be well prepared, logical, and rational to
 establish why the selected option is the best. The need to use
 decision analysis is new for government administrators in
 Russia, where the tradition of authoritarian rule is strong.
 Every application of decision analysis has special value
 under Russian conditions: the analysis must continually dem-
 onstrate its usefulness to all participants in real decision-
 making processes.
 In the United States, despite a longer history of open
 decision making, resource decisions in the Arctic still appear
 to be ad hoc or politically motivated. In either case, a broadly
 understandable, reviewable rationale is missing. The result
 can be political and legal battles in which the facts and public
 interest are buried beneath slogans and simplified images.
 Clarification of a decision, therefore, can improve the deci-
 sion-making process: the decision maker can show that the
 decision was based on full consideration of the issues, and the
 public and stakeholders can see where the key issues lie.
 Because knowledge of the Arctic is generally lacking at the
 national level in most nations, clarity can result in both better
 decisions and a better-informed public.
 The Structure of This Study
 This paper considers how natural resource decisions,
 particularly related to oil and gas development, can be
 clarified, justified, or improved. The research had two prin-
 cipal components.
 O e component was to review and evaluate available
 methods for analyzing and guiding the decision-making
 proc ss. In this component, we compared a quantitative
 approach familiar in the West with a Russian qualitative
 approach. Each approach organizes the data, knowledge, and
value judgements the decision makers would normally use in
 a structured, transparent way that clarifies the options, argu-
 ments, and implied decision. Both approaches are intended to
 e hance the perceptions of individual decision makers. They
 are not attempts at objective analyses. Both methods, espe-
 cially the quantitative one, have been widely used throughout
 the world to make sounder public and other decisions and to
 communicate their grounds and assumptions to interested
 parties (Brown, 1987; Larichev et al., 1995).
 The other component of the research was to develop these
 approaches into a concrete methodology adapted specifically
 to Arctic natural resource decisions and to test them on real
 cases in Siberia and Alaska, both past and present. The
 Russian team, Andre' eva and Larichev, carried out the field-
 work and qualitative decision analysis of the Yamal case.
 Everyone participated in the fieldwork associated with the
 Alaskan permitting case, but the American and Russian
 teams carried out separate analyses according to their respec-
 tive quantitative and qualitative methods.
 We discuss oil and gas development in the Arctic as an
 example of major natural resource decisions and the role of
 decision aids in clarifying how those decisions are made. We
 then give the Russian and American case studies. The former
 addresses a single decision: whether to pipe gas from the
 Yamal Peninsula over the land or under the sea. The latter
 addresses a class of decisions: what procedure federal regu-
 lators should adopt in deciding whether to permit oil and gas
 construction projects in Alaska. Finally, we discuss general
 implications for the Arctic natural resource decision process.
 BACKGROUND:
 ARCTIC OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
 Russia
 Soviet gas development during the 1970s and 1980s was
 a specific effort to create a "gas bridge" between the present
 use of oil to produce energy and a nuclear and coal future.
 Gustaf son (1989) argues that the development of gas was
 necessary following many years in which the centrally planned
 economy needed expanding oil production to survive. The
 opening of the Western Siberian fields and the construction of
 pipelines that would carry gas to Western Europe trans-
 formed the industry. Gas produced 40% of export earnings by
 the late 1980s. The Soviet Union expanded gas production by
 50% in five years starting in 1980-81, an expansion that
 required a huge commitment of resources and development in
 Arctic areas. The original idea, held in the late 1970s, had
 been to develop the northern fields simultaneously with
 Urengoy, Russia' s largest gas field. The cost of development,
 the lack of foreign capital, and the sudden decision to expand
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 gas production dictated that all resources be aimed at the
 large, more southern field. Thus, the development of
 Yamburg and Yamal, the northern fields, was postponed.
 By the late 1980s, when the more northern fields were
 needed to continue meeting targets, conditions had changed.
 In 1989, a report from a state expert panel raised questions
 about the environmental consequences of gas pipeline con-
 struction on the Yamal Peninsula (Expert Commission, 1989).
 This report held up construction of the pipeline that would
 carry gas from the Yamal fields (Fig. 1). Then the collapse of
 the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic turmoil inter-
 vened. In 1993, it was apparent that the income from gas
 production was a necessity for the Russian economy, but gas
 production had actually declined. President Yeltsin made the
 decision to develop the pipeline and open the fields for
 production. National economic security overrode other con-
 siderations. The only question that remained was which
 pipeline route would be used to move the gas to European
 markets. The pressure to develop these fields increased as gas
 production continued to fall in 1994 and 1995.
 But national environmental groups, some with interna-
 tional backing, have begun to play a role familiar in Western
 petroleum development cases. Those responsible for both
 development and regulation now find themselves in a posi-
 tion where their decisions require justification to a much
 broader audience than during the Soviet period.
 The United States
 In December 1968, an oil company discovered the largest
 oil field ever found in North America at Prudhoe Bay on the
 North Slope of Alaska (Fig. 2). A pipeline was needed to
 transport the oil to the ice-free port of Valdez in Prince
 William Sound more than 1000 km away on the southern
 coast. Alaska Native land claims and environmental concerns
 held up construction for almost five years.
 Congress removed these roadblocks, first by the passage
 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, then by
 overriding the environmental concerns in response to the
 Arab oil boycott of 1973-74. The United States, dependent
 on oil imports, had been vulnerable to the boycott. A large
 field on domestic territory held the attraction of regaining
 control over the country's supply. The boycott experience
 convinced the American public that domestic sources of oil
 were important to the national weal. From the time that the
 pipeline began to carry oil in 1977 until the late 1980s, when
 lower prices and field depletion led to declining domestic
 production, the United States produced over half of the oil it
 consumed (Flanders, 1993). The development of the pipeline
 and the North Slope fields appeared to be a successful
 national policy.
 In the 1980s, however, the environment reappeared as a
 counterconcern. The conflict settled on the coastal plain of
 the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Congress had
 understood the potential of the refuge for petroleum when
 officially recognizing it in the Alaska National Interest Lands
 Conservation Act of 1980: Section 1002 of the Act left open
 the possibility that the coastal plain could be explored and
 developed.
 Allowing oil development in a wildlife refuge provided a
 powerful environmental cause, and environmental groups
 st ged an effective campaign against development. In 1991,
Congress voted against ANWR development. The decision
 was not final, however. Both sides, environmentalists and
 industry, see permitting decisions on smaller fields as skir-
 mishes preliminary to another ANWR battle.
 Th  state and regional governments have also benefited
 from North Slope development. Since 1977, Alaska has
 earned over 80% of its income from the oil industry. As
 production declines on the North Slope, state revenues will
 fall. The North Slope Borough taxes both real estate and
 per onal property, which means that it receives revenue on
 the value of both the lease-hold and the equipment at the oil
 fields. T e borough has also taken on substantial debt. Its
 f ture ability to pay its creditors depends upon continuing oil
 production within the borough.
 DECISION ANALYSIS
 Deci on analysis is a broad paradigm for the systematic
 evaluation of alternative actions, based on all available infor-
 mation, as a basis for choice among them. Its purpose is
 normally to make decisions better and clearer. Its inputs
 capture the knowledge and judgement of decision makers:
 their perception of what the options are, what the options'
 consequences might be, and the relative importance of crite-
 ria characterizing these consequences. The class of decisions
 involved here concerns two or more discrete options that can
 be evaluated according to two or more criteria.
 Decision analysis has two variants: qualitative and quan-
 titative. Qualitative or categorical decision analysis (CD A)
 relies on natural language and non-numerical categorization
 of the considerations in a choice. Quantitative or numerical
 decision analysis (NDA) represents uncertainty and value in
 the form of numbers and combines them in a quantitative
 model (derived from statistical decision theory). The qualita-
 tive analysis has been associated with Russian decision
 analysis; the quantitative, with Western decision making.
 The two approaches may draw out different aspects of the
 same problem.
 The Russian Approach
 Descriptions of the methodological base of CDA are in
 Lariche v ( 1 987, 1 992) and Larichev and Moshkovich ( 1 997).
 CDA tries to use the natural language of the decision maker,
 active parties, and potential experts to structure a problem.
 The goal of structuring is to define the criteria to be evaluated
 for the initially given options. For each criterion, an evalua-
 tion scale is constructed with a small number of quality grades
 ranging from best to worst. These are drawn from natural
 language, for example, "no damage to the environment";
 "moderate damage to the environment"; "major damage to
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 FIG. 1. Proposed pipeline routes and gas fields, Yamal Peninsula, Russia. The sea route (solid line) crosses Baydaratskaya Bay from the Bovanenkova field.
 The land route (dashed line) follows the proposed railway line around the bay.
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 FIG. 2. Major oil fields, North Slope, Alaska, USA. The Niakuk and Badami fields are noted by underlining and italics.
 the environment." When major measurement difficulties
 exist, relative (rather than absolute) evaluations of the options
 are recommended (Oseredko et al., 1982; Huber and Huber,
 1987).
 Larichev and Moshkovich (1997) describe the special
 methods CDA uses for comparing alternatives through these
 verbal evaluations. Pair-wise compensation is one such
 method: used when the initially given options are few; it
 compares the options qualitatively, pulling out their relative
 merits and deficiencies. At every stage of the decision proc-
 ess, CDA helps the decision maker reduce the decision to a
 more manageable size. For instance, evaluations on criteria
 that are not really different are eliminated. By this means, the
 number of evaluative criteria for comparison is reduced.
 This method then tries to find a condition where the
 disadvantages of one option outweigh the disadvantages of
 the other. First, the decision maker ranks the disadvantages of
 the two options separately. Then special reference options are
 created and presented to the decision maker. The options have
 the same number of criteria as the original problem, but they
 only retain the original, real differences in one or two criteria.
 For the other criteria, both options put forward the best (or
 worst) evaluations. The decision maker is then asked to
 choose between the two reference options. Put another way,
 the decision maker is asked: Given the other criteria being
 equal, which of these two options would you prefer when they
 differ on these two (or one) criteria? When comparing the
 eference options, the decision maker goes through the pair-
 wise comparisons and, for each pair, chooses one option's
 disadvantages over those of the other. If all the disadvantages
 of one option are found to be less harmful than those of the
 other, the problem is solved. When comparing the two refer-
 ence options, the decision maker performs a psychologically
 valid operation (Larichev, 1992).
 When only doing qualitative comparisons, one can end up
 with a situation of noncomparability. Noncomparability oc-
 curs when some evaluations are better for the first option and
 some better for the second. To resolve this problem, a new,
 more promising option is sought that could be better than the
 two initially given. The method used helps the decision maker
 to find the minimum changes needed in the evaluations of
existing options to create a new, better alternative.
 In Russia, as in the United States, many active groups
 participate in Arctic-related decisions, including local au-
 thorities, the local population, and the company responsible
 for construction. In the post-Soviet period, reaching agree-
 ment among all active groups is a necessity. Decision analysis
 plays a special role in Russian Arctic problems by examining
 the positions of different active groups, identifying the favored
 alternative for each group, and preparing for negotiations
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 among them. The same analysis is carried out with all the
 different active groups, and differences in positions are
 analyzed. New options are developed with the idea of finding
 agreement among groups.
 The American Approach
 Numerical decision analysis (NDA) essentially translates
 judgement and knowledge relevant to evaluating some choice
 into a quantitative model (Raiffa, 1968; Zeckhauser et al.,
 1996). Normally, NDA calculates a numerical value for each
 option, so that the best option is clear. For example, probabil-
 ity and utility values are attached to each possible conse-
 quence of an option, and the option with the highest
 probability-weighted expected utility is logically preferred.
 This type of model often suits a case where uncertainty is
 critical.
 In many environmental management decisions, the criti-
 cal issue is conflicting objectives, and another common
 model often works well. The competing criteria are listed
 along with the decision-maker's numerical judgement of
 their relative importance. The impact of each option on each
 criterion is evaluated separately from the importance of each
 criterion. The preferred option is the one with the highest
 importance-weighted impact. High impact in areas of little
 importance can balance out small impact in areas of great
 importance.
 An NDA approach is normally comprehensive: it should
 characterize all considerations (values and assessments) rel-
 evant to a choice, even if at a highly aggregate level. For
 example, an importance-weighted impact model does not
 attempt to reduce the number of criteria per se, though it may
 group them into fewer classes.
 The NDA may use qualitative assessments and natural
 language preparatory to developing numerical values. This
 qualitative step may prove all that is necessary, and leaders in
 the field recommend it.
 The differences between the two approaches may be seen
 through specific applications. The literature is largely limited
 to comparisons of verbal and numerical treatments of the
 uncertainty aspect of decision analysis (Erev and Cohen,
 1990; Rapoport et al., 1990; Hamm, 1991; Wallsten et al.,
 1993).
 THE RUSSIAN CASE:
 GAS TRANSPORT FROM YAMAL
 Background
 As noted, the development of the Yamal gas fields has
 become a matter of national importance. However, this devel-
 opment has many unresolved problems. An essential one is
 the choice between two routes connecting the gas fields to the
 existing gas pipeline system. A senior Russian official wanted
 to get reliable confirmation that RAO Gazprom's preliminary
 choice was the best. RAO Gazprom is the joint stock company
 developing the project. The Russian authors of this paper
 have been working with various stakeholders in the decision.
 During the development of the project, the idea of straighten-
 ing the pipeline route by crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (the sea
 route) received strong support. The second option (the land
 route) would cross the Yamal Peninsula to the east of the bay.
 The choice has been the subject of bitter discussion between
 two project institutes over several years. The gas project
 institute Giprospetsgaz in St. Petersburg favored the land
 route, but the gas project institute Yusniiprogaz in Donetsk
 (Ukrain ) proposed crossing the bay. Both institutes have
arguments for and against the sea and land routes. The
 d cisi n and the start of pipeline construction were recently
 postponed, partly because of the complexity of this choice.
 Thus, the task is one of decision making with two options.
 This problem concerns unknown natural conditions, the
 interests of different groups influencing the choice, and
 contradictory appraisals of the alternatives on various crite-
 ria, as well as other things. For a more detailed description of
 this case, see Andre'eva et al. (1995).
 Two Options
 The two options are the sea route crossing the bay and the
 land route. The following distinguishing characteristics or
 criteria w re initially included in the analysis: (1) length of
 the route; (2) terms of construction; (3) time for construction;
 (4) cost of construction; (5) impact on the environment; (6)
 risk of a pipeline rupture accident; (7) consequences of a
 pipeline rupture accident; (8) time needed to recover from an
 accident; and (9) uncertain and unknown factors. With
 respect to (6), the option of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay
 involves unique features that could cause an accident: (a) the
 instability of the shore because of permafrost processes and
 sea ice impact; (b) the rupture of or damage to the pipeline
 through ice scouring; and (c) the capability of icebergs to
 reach Baydaratskaya Bay. With respect to (9), the analysis
 points out that the decision must be made under conditions of
 major uncertainty because the construction start date has
 been set for the near future.
 Active Groups
 Before comparing the two options, we must analyze who
 will make the choice and how. A single decision maker is not
 likely to make the decision because of the high project cost.
 On the contrary, several institutions and organizations, or
 "active groups," are taking part directly or indirectly in the
 decision. They are: (1) RAO Gazprom, which ordered the
 development of the project and must evaluate and confirm the
 pipeline route, and its operational division in North Siberia,
 Nadymgazprom; (2) the two project research institutes that
 developed the two options; (3) two government ministries,
 the Ministry of the Economy, which evaluates the project's
 economics, and the Russian Federation Committee for the
 Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, which
 evaluates its ecological effects; (4) the local authorities in the
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 Yamal region, who must give their agreement to one option
 of the pipeline; and (5) local communities and representatives
 of Native peoples, whose territory and resources will be
 affected by the construction of the pipeline system. The active
 groups have different interests, and one might expect that the
 groups would support different options.
 The Application of Russian CD A to the Yamal Case
 It is logical to take into account only the criteria for which
 one can find an essential difference between the options. For
 example, the preliminary estimate shows that the required
 construction time is 5 -7 years for both options. The unstable
 national economic situation can affect the starting time.
 Because this problem exists for both options, the analysis can
 ignore the problem, as it is not relevant to a choice between
 the two. Route length, time of construction, and terms of
 construction can be considered under the criterion "cost."
 The terms of construction can also be considered under
 "probability of an accident," since difficult conditions can
 affect the quality of construction and hence increase the
 likelihood of a future accident. The relevant criteria and their
 evaluations are shown in Table 1 :
 1. Cost The cost of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (Csea)
 was determined by a foreign firm that is ready to
 construct this part of the pipeline. The initial estimates
 show that Csea is a little higher than CUd.
 2. Ecological impact. Both options would have a negative
 impact on the environment. Though the sea option
 contains some uncertainty, ecological impact is much
 larger for the land option: a land pipeline would cross a
 lot of land and many rivers.
 3. Probability of accident Because of unstable shores and
 the possibility of ice scouring, the probability of an
 accident is higher for the sea option.
 4. Consequences of the accident An accident on land is
 usually connected with an explosion and destruction of
 the environment. A sea accident would not cause an
 explosion, but the gas would rise through the water and
 cracks in the ice. The land option is clearly worse.
 5 . Reliability of gas supply. The repair of the pipeline after
 an accident would require much more time under the
 sea option, particularly since the bay is ice-free for only
 60-70 days per year. The sea option is clearly worse.
 6. Uncertain and unknown factors. Many more uncertain
 and unknown factors are connected with the realization
 of the unique project of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay.
 The sea option is clearly worse.
 These comparative, qualitative evaluations are practically
 all we can measure; other qualitative measurements are more
 difficult. How does one draw conclusions with such weak
 measurements?
 As noted, CDA methods do not guarantee that pair-wise
 comparisons of the disadvantages of two alternatives will
 always lead to a clear preference. This situation resulted with
 TABLE 1. CDA analysis of gas pipeline routes from the Yamal
 Peninsula (Russia).
 Criteria Sea Option Land Option
 Cost Csea CJ
 Ecological impact Esea E,and
 Probability of accident Psea Pkmé
 Consequences of accident Aiea Aland
 Reliability of gas supply Rsea /?w
 Uncertain and unknown factors Usea Uiand
 1 The favored option according to each criterion is indicated by
 bold italics, e.g., Cw indicates that the land option is less costly.
 the two Yamal pipeline options. The greater uncertainty and
 les er reliability of gas supply for the sea option were worse
than the ecological impact from the land option. But the
n gative consequences of an accident under the land option
 were worse than the greater probability of an accident under
 the sea option. The research team, working with the decision
 makers and experts, undertook the development of a new,
 more promising option from the existing ones.
 A method for aiding strategic choice called ASTRIDA
 (Berkeley et al., 1991) was employed to define a new and
 potentially best option. In the case of incomparability,
 ASTRIDA proposes the modification of one existing option.
 That is, the method asks the question: what needs to be
 changed in one option to make it clearly equal to or better than
 the other option? Below is the analysis corresponding to the
 interests of RAO Gazprom.
 A new sea route option resulted from the search for ways
 to change the characteristics of the sea route. Discussions
 with experts suggested ways in which the negative aspects of
 that option could be removed:
 To eliminate problems from seashore instability, the pipeline
 could be put through special shafts at a safe distance from the
 shore. This construction would incur additional costs (Cshafts).
 To avoid damage to the pipeline from ice scouring, the
 pipeline could be laid in special trenches 1.5-2 m deep. As
 these trenches would be deeper than those called for in the
 project plan, the costs (Cinches) would also be additional.
 To eliminate the danger from icebergs, a special observa-
 tion service and a ship to drag an iceberg away would be used.
 The cost of the service and ship is denoted by Cice.
 Adding these features to the sea option creates a new
 alternative with an element of uncertainty that is approxi-
 mately equal (from the point of view of the experts) to that of
 the traditional land option. With the development of a special
 repair service for the underwater pipes, the reliability of the
 gas supply could be made equal. Thus, no significant differ-
 ences would exist between the sea and land routes except cost
 and ecological impact. The cost of the new sea option (Cea+
 Cshaft + Ctrenches + Cice) would clearly be higher and the land
 option would still create greater environmental destruction.
 But now the comparison can be considered as one between
 higher costs (sea) and lower environmental protection (land).
 The comparison between two factors presents a real, crucial
 choice to be made.
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 Analogous analyses were made from the positions of other
 active groups. The development of a new option was useful
 in this case, too. With regard to the two initial options, only
 the positions of the local authorities and local population
 were clear: they supported the sea option. The new sea option
 was also more attractive to the Russian Federation Commit-
 tee for the Protection of the Environment and to Nadym-
 gazprom. But, the positions of Gazprom and the Ministry of
 the Economy in the final, crucial choice presented above were
 influenced by the difficult financial situation in Russia. The
 Ministry was inclined toward the less costly land route.
 The Influence of Recommendations
 Our report, with the recommendations presented above,
 was given to RAO Gazprom. At that time, the original sea
 option was more attractive to the majority of the organiza-
 tion's managers. The intention to begin pipeline construction
 was strong, and they had expected that the report would
 support this option. Instead, the report added doubts about its
 acceptability, and construction was postponed. One reason
 was the uncertain and unknown factors described by the
 report. During the delay, new investigations were undertaken
 on the problem of seashore instability and ice regimes in
 Baydaratskaya Bay. These studies were an objective confir-
 mation that the available data were insufficient to ensure safe
 operations.
 That delay has now turned into a cancellation. Market
 prices have been too low, problems of investment remain
 unresolved, and drilling in an unstable sandy-permafrost
 surface still presents complex engineering challenges.
 AMOCO, which had a major interest in the area, has pulled
 out completely. It appears that the fields will not be developed
 until 2005, and liquid natural gas (LNG) ships are under
 assessment as an alternative to pipelines for transporting gas
 out of the region when development does take place.
 Possible NDA of the Yamal Case
 NDA could be attempted on the same problem. Larichev
 et al. (1995), for example, present a hypothetical "impor-
 tance-weighted impact" model based on the same set of
 criteria: cost, ecology, accident risk, etc. However, instead of
 presenting the perspective of each active group (as in the
 above CD A), the model could represent the view of someone
 wishing to decide which pipeline route best served the na-
 tion's interest or to argue the case before a public audience.
 For example, a responsible citizen or government official
 might supply the impact and importance inputs, and the
 conclusions would be attributed to that person.
 The evaluation scale was from 0 to -100, where 0 is no
 impact of any kind, and -100 is the worst plausible impact
 under a particular criterion. On one illustrative set of inputs
 proposed by a research colleague, the land route scored -20
 and the sea route scored -15. So that e valuator apparently
 favored the less damaging sea route. She considered ecology
 to be the most important criterion and assessed the land route
 to have a significantly larger impact. The effect of alternative
 inputs by the same or other evaluators could be readily
 calculated.
 THE AMERICAN CASE: A PERMITTING PROCEDURE
 FOR OIL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
 S tting
 The Russian case addresses how to help make a single,
 still-active decision. The American case addresses how to
 develop a reusable procedure for a class of future decisions.
 A major recurring decision facing U.S. regulators with
 responsibility for Arctic development is whether to permit
 Alaskan oil construction projects, with or without restric-
 tions. A number of parties, including industry and environ-
 mental groups, have been concerned that controversial
 ecisions - such as whether to allow oil drilling in the
 Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge - are often subject to
 arbitrary and unpredictable pressures, for example, major
 shifts in the political climate. They have clamored for a
 standardized, "scientific" procedure that would not be
 susceptible to manipulation.
 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (CoE) Alaska District
 has primary responsibility for evaluating permit applications,
 using the wetlands guidelines of the Clean Water Act. Typi-
 cally one analyst within the Regulatory Branch makes a
 recommendation, based upon available evidence, through the
 Branch Chief to the District Engineer, who confers with
 various other federal and state agencies before rendering a
 decision.
 Research Task
 Our research team decided to first test the technical feasi-
 bility of our ideas on a past permitting incident: whether to
 permit British Petroleum (BP) to build a causeway to its
 Niakuk oil field in the Arctic Ocean. Though CoE personnel
 provided extensive input on specific aspects of the case,
 including the criteria that are used in deciding permits, we felt
 that the issue was still too controversial to show how their
 analysis might have been done. We chose instead to show the
 results as ¿/the applicant were putting forward its argument
 based upon the categories and definitions of impacts that the
 CoE might use. We put together the evaluation described here
 entirely from secondary sources. BP, the actual applicant, had
 no input.
 Niakuk Background
 In the late 1980s, BP sought permission to develop the
 Niakuk oil field from an artificial island about 2 km offshore
 in the Beaufort Sea, using a gravel causeway to pipe the oil
 ashore. The Alaska District of CoE gave a conditional permit
 that did not allow for the construction of the proposed
 causeway, on the grounds that the proposal did not meet the
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 TABLE 2. NDA hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application. Positive consequences are given in bold. An
 asterisk ("*") indicates an unacceptable level of impact, and a dagger ("t") indicates that the option is economically impracticable on
 that criterion.
 Affected party Type of consequence Causeway Slant drilling Interpretation of Unacceptable Importance
 impacts impacts very high impact
 General public (environmental concerns)
 Fish populations High* Very low 10 years to restore High ♦♦
 Animal populations Very low Very low 10 years to restore Low ♦♦♦
 Aquatic sites (wetlands) Low Low Comparable to Everglades High ♦ ♦
 Other fauna (endangered species) Very low Very low 5% probability of extinction
 Water quality Very low Medium* 2 spills over project life Low ♦♦
 Wilderness/ecology High Low Comparable to Deadhorse
 National interest
 Oil independence Very low Very low 5% less oil imports
 State and local
 Revenue (royalties) Low Very low $ 1 B over life of field
 Local population
 Fisheries Very low Very low 1 major species out 1 year
 Subsistence (waterfowl) Very low Very low 1 major species out 1 year
 Employment Low Low 200 more permanent jobs
 Economy Very low Very low 20% improvement
 Industry
 Niakuk profitability Medium Very lowt $ IB earnings Very lowt ♦♦♦
 Other BP profitability Very high Low $ IB earnings ♦♦♦
 Other firms' profitability High Very Low $ IB earnings
 terms of an agreement between the oil companies and federal
 regulators to maintain fish habitat. A regulatory guideline
 [404(b)(l) of the Clean Water Act] says that, irrespective of
 other considerations, a permit has to be denied if a fish
 population would be adversely affected. The agreement among
 the companies and agencies had been to judge potential
 changes in fish populations on the basis of changes in habitat.
 Causeways were believed to affect the habitat of arctic cisco
 by changing coastal current patterns. The senior official
 judged the causeway to have overall social value; however,
 under existing regulatory procedures, regulators cannot trade
 off some negative environmental impacts against other posi-
 tive values.
 The Alaska District also issued a general directive favoring
 alternative means of accessing offshore oil, such as slant
 drilling from the shore, over causeways. This directive
 raised the case from a single decision to a precedent, with
 implications for further development. BP had argued against
 slant drilling, on the grounds that it was more costly than
 causeway construction - costly enough to prevent devel-
 opment of the field.
 The federal government put pressure on CoE headquarters
 in Washington to rescind these decisions, pending additional
 data. CoE acquiesced. A Congressional committee in turn
 challenged this reversal, claiming improper industrial influ-
 ence. BP ultimately dropped the causeway in favor of slant
 drilling (which, in fact, proved quite profitable, as slant
 drilling allows greater recovery).
 Research Effort
 We sought an aid that would help make the regulator's
 decision process sounder, smoother, more defensible, and
 less wasteful of national resources. The research team met
 wi h the regulator (Alask  Di trict of CoE) four years after
 he events described, to develop an NDA-oriented aid that
 could have been used o support the initial local permitting
 application. T e analysis was intended to reflect faithfully
 whatever knowl ge and thinki g had been available to BP at
 the time (without attempting to improve them). Its contribu-
 tion was to find the best way to communicate the likely
 consequences of eac  of three permitt ng options (no oil field,
 oil field with a causeway, a d oil ield without a causeway)
 and to determine if those consequences were acceptable.
 We considered three alternative formats: qualitative,
 graphic, and numeric l (Table 2, Figs. 3 and 4). In each case
 we took into account all consequences - economic, environ-
 mental, str tegic, etc. - no matte  how intangible. Impor-
tance and impact judgements were separately defined and
 independently evaluated. We consider d both the existing
 decision regime, i  which thresholds eliminated an option,
 and an alternative one, in which decision makers could
 consider that he good aspects of an option might compensate
 for its bad asp cts.
 Qualitative Rep se tation
 The first two c lumns of Tabl  2 li s  co sequences, grouped
 by who is ma nly affected. Consequences in bold indicate
 positive impacts. Columns 3 and 4 predict consequences for
 each option. They show tha  some impacts are more accept-
 able with slant drilling (very low impact on fish population)
 and some are better with the causeway (water quality).
 Column 5 clarifies the meaning of the levels of impact by
 defining "very high impact." In the case of "fish population,"
 for example, it is int rpret d as "10 years to restore" (or
 equivalent harm). Column 6 indicates what is unacceptable
 according to statute. For example, if statutory limits were the
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 Affected Type of Causeway Impacts Slant Drilling Impacts Wt.
 Party Consequence
 Fish Population
 General Animal Max Max ■
 Population | | I
 Public Aquatic Sites Max Max
 (Wetlands) | |
 (Environ- Other Fauna
 mental (Endangered) ^_
 Concerns) Water Quaüty Max Max
 Wilderness/
 Ecology _
 National "°ü I
 Interest dependence = = |
 State and Revenue






 Niakuk Min Min
 l
 Industry Rest of BP
 Other Firms
 ■■■■■■ '
 FIG. 3. NDA hypothetical graphic analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application, using bar graphs. Vertical lines, labelled "Max" or "Min" indicate an unacceptable
 impact. The black portion of t e horizontal bars indicate  im acts favoring slant drilling, while the cross-hatching indicates th se favoring the c usew y. In this
 graphical presentati n, impac  and importance are sep rate. The NDA analysi  maintains separate rows for all of the criteria that must go in o the d cision.
 controlling principle, the impact on fish population alone
 would make the causeway unacceptable.
 On the other hand if, contrary to literal interpretation of
 the current regulations, compensation among impacts were
allowed, the preferred ptio  would depend on which
 i pact is mor import nt, as shown in the last colu n. In
pr ctice, a regulato  y stretch interpre ation f thresh-
 olds to take trade-offs i to c ou . This qualitative for-
 a  may help regul ors make th  nec s ry evaluati n
 informally.
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 Affected Type of Causeway Impacts Slant Drilling Impacts
 Party Consequence
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 Ecology R5S55S3S
 National Oü i i
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 Economy - I - •
 Niakuk ^H
 Industry J -i^^^m
 J Rest of BP ^^H
 Other Firms ^^B |
 Favor CW __ m_mmmm_t_mammmmm_m_m_^ _____
 NET DIFFERENCES ^■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■B __ m_mmmm_t_mammmmm_m_m_^ _____
 Favor SD ^^^^^^^^^^^
 hio. 4. NDA hypothetical graphic analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application, using boxes. Impact and importance are combined into boxes. Width represents
 impact and height importance. The small vertical line indicates an unacceptable or impractical impact. The black portion of the boxes indicates that slant drilling
 is favored. The cross-hatching indicates that the causeway is favored. An observer or decision maker can readily compare areas and see the similarity between a
 small impact on a criterion of great importance and a large impact on an area of less importance. The two bars at the bottom graphically display the sum of the net
 differences in areas.
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 Graphic Format
 Figure 3 expresses essentially all the same judgements as
 Table 2, but quantitatively, in a graphic format, and more
 precisely. The level of impact, positive or negative, of each
 option on each consequence, is represented by a horizontal
 bar. For example, in "fish population," "high" impact is
 represented by a bar that is long, but not as long as a bar for
 the maximum or "very high" impact. (Equivalently, that
 impact could be given a numerical score on a scale from 0-
 100, correspondingly defined). The small vertical line above
 the bar labelled "Max" indicates the maximum acceptable
 impact, noted as "high" for "fish population" impact of
 "causeway" in Table 2, but now more precisely represented
 as a little less than the width of the box - and therefore again
 characterized as "unacceptable." The bar in the final column
 represents importance weight, corresponding to the number
 of stars in the last column of Table 2. The long bar for "fish
 population" corresponds to three stars in Table 2. However,
 it is less high than the bar for "animal population," which also
 got three stars in Table 2, reflecting the greater precision of
 Figure 3.
 In Figure 4, two dimensions of impact and importance are
 combined as the area of the box (that is, as the product of
 impact and importance). This area indicates the net effect of
 an option's consequence on that criterion. Thus, the cause-
 way has a significant effect via fish population (as shown by
 a large box) because the size of the impact is large and the
 importance is substantial (but not as high as some others.)
 By comparing the total area of boxes favoring causeway
 (shown black) with those favoring slant drilling (cross-
 hatched), we have an indication of which option is preferred.
 Since the causeway area is clearly much larger than the slant
 drilling area, the causeway option should be accepted, ac-
 cording to this example. One can see by eye that the greater
 area favoring causeway is due largely to the high impact and
 high importance attached to three measures of industry prof-
 itability. This evaluation is what one might expect from an oil
 company applicant. The regulators do not have to accept
 these importance weights, of course; they can substitute their
 own assessments when coming to a decision.
 Although numbers can communicate the same assess-
 ments, these graphic representations can be better for com-
 munication. Whereas the numbers themselves may be difficult
 for a lay person to understand, the relative shape and size of
 the different boxes can convey the important differences.
 Finally, the boxes may avoid conveying a false precision.
 Whereas the decision maker may not intend to imply a
 precision of, say, 35 (as opposed to 34 or 36), the box diagram
 does not necessarily convey anything but a fairly rough
 estimate.
 Handling Uncertainty
 This graphical format does not capture uncertainty (nor
 does the qualitative format). A single quantity represents
 each impact prediction, regardless of how suspect the
 assessment may be. Although uncertainty may be important
 for a risk-averse decision maker, if the causeway impacts are
 plausibly no more uncertain than for slant drilling, the cause-
 way would still be preferred. The decision maker can always
 disc unt the value of very uncertain impacts by making
 single-number estimates conservative. However, it may be
 hel ful o register the uncertainty explicitly, to make clear to
 any observer where the "net" impact estimate came from.
 Though we could not do it here, one could handle this by
 shading the boxes darker for more certain estimates, or
 simply by adding the words "low," "medium," or "high" in a
 column for uncertainty.
 A purely numerical presentation can incorporate estimates
 of uncertainty algebraically. If each impact is assigned a
 ma gin of error, e.g., 10 ± 30, an overall margin of error for
 the net value of each option can be approximated by a
 formula.
 Note that "uncertainty" as used here refers to both the
 doubt of the decision maker toward the given estimate and the
 amount of p ssible variation in the particular criteria. On the
 whole, however, the decision makers were most concerned
 about the precision of a given estimate.
 Live Decision: Badami
 BP recently proposed development of another new field on
 the North Slope, called Badami. The American team met with
 a regulator and used the decision aid to analyze two options
 under the then active permit request. (BP has subsequently
 withdrawn this particular request and has provided a new
 one). In the plan to develop Badami, BP proposed several
 innovations that would have reduced environmental impact.
 These include a small footprint for the drilling pad that takes
 advantage of slant drilling, transportation of materials to the
 site during winter to eliminate the need for a road, and chilled
 rather than heated oil in the pipeline. One reading of this effort
 suggests that in addition to making the Badami field more
 harmonious with the landscape, the approach could set a
 precedent for development in ANWR.
 The regulator identified the pipeline construction plan as
 the key issue in deciding on the permit. The pipeline would
 have connected the field with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
 System. The proposer, BP, wanted to bury the pipeline
 completely, even at river crossings. Traditionally, pipelines
 cross rivers on bridges, so completely burying the pipeline
 would have been new. Buried pipelines cause a problem by
 dissipating heat into the surrounding permafrost, causing the
 development of thermokarsts around the pipe. For this reason,
 pipelines are generally kept aboveground in permafrost areas.
 BP proposed new technology to overcome this problem.
 At river crossings, the pipeline would be put below ice
 scour depth. Sagbends, dips in the pipeline on either side of
 the river crossing, would be set back from the river bank far
 enough to allow a gradual transition to a deeper substream
 level and avoid the effects from bank erosion. The pipeline
 would require four major and multiple minor creek crossings.
 The regulator felt that consideration should be concentrated
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 TABLE 3. NDA hypothetical numerical analysis of Badami (Alaska) permit decision.
 Completely Buried Buried Except at Crossings Advantage
 Consequence, impact on Importance1 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Buried
 Special aquatic sites impact -0.3 15 0.15 -4.5 7 0.15 -2.1 -2.4
 Anadromous fish - Sea -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
 Anadromous fish - River -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
 Anadromous fish - positive effect 1 50 0.15 50 45 0.15 45 5
 Other fish/aquatics -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 5 0.15 -1.5 0
 Wildlife -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 10 0.15 -3 1.5
 Marine mammals -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 5 0.15 -1.5 0
 Other endangered species -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
 Ecosystem -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
 Permafrost integrity -1 15 0.8 -15 5 0.15 -5 -10
 Physical properties -0.7 5 0.15 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
 Circulation -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
 Erosion, accretion -0.5 10 0.5 -5 5 0.15 -2.5 -2.5
 Turbidity -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0
 Ice dynamics -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
 Oil pollution -0.7 5 0.3 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
 Other water quality -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
 Soil quality -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
 Fisheries -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0
 Energy 1 15 0.15 15 15 0.15 15 0
 Pro-wilderness sentiment -1 40 0.15 -40 40 0.15 -40 0
 Native way of life -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
 State/borough oil finances 0.8 40 0.15 32 40 0.15 32 0
 Construction business and employment 0.8 30 0.15 24 30 0.15 24 0
 Operations business and employment 0.8 10 0.15 8 10 0.15 8 0
 Other state/borough finances 0.2 10 0.15 2 5 0.15 1 1
 Other -0.2 5 0.15 -1 15 o'l5 -3 2
 Badami income for BP 0.3 20 0.15 6 10 0.15 3 3
 Precedent for industry 0.3 50 0.15 15 10 0A5 3 12
 Meeting applicant's purpose 0.7 100 0 70 70 0.15 49 21
 Precedent for environmentalists -0.3 35 0.15 -10.5 10 0A5 -3 -7.5
 Totals 20.89 104.5 16.75 81.4 23.1
 1 A negative number indicates the importance of a negative impact.
 2 Total uncertainty equals the square root of the sum of the estimated uncertainties for each criterion.
 3 Contribution equals importance times impact.
 on this issue. Opponents to the permit had also highlighted the
 innovative pipeline design, though the permit itself was
 relatively uncontroversial.
 The research team used essentially the same format analy-
 sis as with the Niakuk case. The difference was in the
 arrangement of effects. The final analysis was done by the
 regulator without the American team present, three months
 after the original meeting.
 Since the permit decision is still active, and BP's applica-
 tion has changed since the analysis, we cannot display the
 resulting table. Table 3 does, however, have a similar struc-
 ture and outcome to what the regulator gave. The research
 team's analysis also included hypothetical judgements of
 uncertainty to show how these might look. The completely
 buried pipeline is displayed as being more in the public
 interest than the pipeline raised over stream crossings, with
 an evaluation of 104.5 ± 20.89 versus 81.4 ± 16.75. In the
 researchers' rendering of the table, the completely buried
 option had positive effects from gravel pits in creating im-
 proved habitat for anadromous fish, in the precedent effect for
 the industry, and in meeting the applicant's purpose. The
 major negative difference was in the possible impact on
 permafrost integrity. The table suggests that the completely
 buried option may have  greater and more uncertain effect on
 permafrost inte rity. This uncer ainty reflected the relative
 n wness of the approach. Other major negatives might be
 po sible rosion and setting what environmentalists might
 consider a bad precedent.
CDA Analysis of Niakuk
 Table 4 hows a qualitative analysis of the Niakuk
decision c rried out by the Ru sian res arch team. The
 analysis, which shows eight v iables, was done from the
 perspec ive of a regulator. It adds a third alternative to the
 two onsidered in he NDA analy is: a subsea pipeline
 bel the ice scour level of th  ocean's floor. Of the
 cr teria, one is considered to have no difference among the
 o t ons: ocial cons quences. Qual ative analysis does
 not attempt to draw out every single point of difference in
 detail. It seeks only the "broad brush strokes."
Because of the threshold fo  nadro ous fish, incorpo-
rated into the impact on th  vironment, the causeway was
 co sidered unacce table and was eliminated as an option.
 Th  question then arose, was there another option that could
 be used as a better alterna ive to slant drilling? The major
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 TABLE 4. CD A hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permitting decision. The italics indicate the major differences among
 the options.
 Evaluation of Alternatives
 Groups1 Criteria Causeway Slant Drilling Subsea Pipeline
 ABC Impact on the environment Unacceptable2 Acceptable Acceptable
 AB Damage to wilderness Big No Small
 AB Social consequences - Equally negligible -
 ABC Quantity of oil Basic volume Less Equal to basic
 C Cost of construction Basic cost $14-30 million more (5-10%) $37 million more (10-15%)
 A Oil independence Estimated input Less Equal
 ABC Uncertain factors3 A few Very many Many
 ABC Reliability of pipeline4 Normal Normal Less
 1 Active groups: A = public; B = local authorities; C = oil companies.
 2 The available knowledge confirms a real danger to the environment.
 3 A lack of knowledge for effective realization of the alternatives.
 4 Risk of accident: detecting and eliminating.
 differences between the two remaining options were found in
 the cost of construction, the number of uncertain factors, and
 the reliability of the pipeline. The buried pipeline had disad-
 vantages in its extra cost and reduced reliability. Slant drilling
 was disadvantageous in its many uncertain factors, which
 might have blocked its effective realization.
 At this point, the qualitative analysis would have needed to
 know whether the disadvantages of the buried pipeline could
 have been made at least equal to those of slant drilling. The
 buried pipeline, according to the analysis, had a number of
 advantages over the alternative. Reducing the cost of con-
 struction or increasing the reliability to the level of slant
 drilling might have made a buried pipeline a better alterna-
 tive. In any case, the analysis can aid the decision maker by
 showing where the major differences lie.
 DISCUSSION: COMPARING APPROACHES
 Because actual decision cases are used, an experimental
 situation cannot be created in which "treated" and "un-
 treated" parallel cases can be compared. The analyst or the
 decision maker can only judge that the decision made with the
 help of the decision aids was better than it might have been
 otherwise. Does this limitation render a third-party evalua-
 tion of decision aids completely impossible? Not entirely.
 Secondary criteria can suggest whether a particular technique
 is better to particular ends. In the case of the Arctic, these
 secondary evaluation criteria can address the characteristic
 needs of decision makers in this region of the globe.
 Decision Issues Important to the Arctic
 The two methods studied here suggest at least nine deci-
 sion issues: complexity reduction, consideration of alterna-
 tives, personal clarification for the decision maker, finding
 compromises, favoring of interests, communication, ability
 to reuse the method, ease of use, and incorporation of uncer-
 tainty (Table 5).
 Most of these sec ndary criteria, though important to the
 Arctic, are not Arctic-spe ific: they would be important for
 public environmental decisions e sewh re in the world. Their
 importan e to the Arctic is a matter of degree rather than kind.
 For example, complexity reduction addresses a problem that
 is found throughou  environmental decision making: how to
 make comparisons across several different criteria that use
 different measures and incorporate diff rent l vels f cer-
tainty (e.g., Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global
 Change, 1 994: 1 8). However, decisions about Arctic resources
 tend to be more public, because th y are more likely to be on
public l nd and involve more groups with divergent interests.
 Pe sonal clarification and communication are also important
 to any public policy decision. Communication may be more
 difficult for Arctic issues because the topics and their impor-
 tance may be farther from the knowledge of most people,
 even those involved in government decision making. The
 applicability of a decision tool to a class of decisions, and the
 attendant ability to reuse it, will mean that the procedure can
 become part of a management regime and provide a clear and
 consistent approach to those decisions. A better understand-
 ing on the part of the public is more likely to emerge.
 Consideration of alternatives may be more important in the
Arctic because the environment may benefit from or require
 new technology or approaches. An important corollary to the
 consideration of alternatives is whether the methods aid the
 search for compromises among groups. Arctic decisions
 typically involve different interest groups within the same
 level of government, among the levels of government, and
 within the larger public. By extension, does one approach or
 the other favor particular interestsl This issue also raises
 ease of use as a question, since more technical approaches
 may favor better-educated or more experienced groups. The
 incorporation of uncertainty is perhaps the most Arctic-
 specific issue, because the Arctic environment is character-
 ized by large seasonal and interannual variation; decision
 makers have a poorer information base, as less research has
 been conducted; and oil companies must deal with wellhead
 price swings brought about by the large fixed costs for
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 TABLE 5. Comparison of CDA and NDA on aspects of decision making important to Arctic resource decisions.
 Criteria Categorical Numerical Importance to Arctic
 Dealing with Complexity »Eliminates criteria where no »Seeks numerical value for each •Public ownership of land and
 differences exist. criterion on importance and impact environmental characteristics can
 • Seeks to reduce some criteria to dollar scales and combination of two. create several interacting issues,
 amounts. »Allows direct comparison of • Interest groups can purposely create
 • Alters the negative features of one alternatives and criteria through complexity to prolong debate or shift
 alternative to create anew alternative. scores, and suggests a decision. costs.
 • Creates "psychologically valid"
 binary choices.
 Considering Alternatives • Forces consideration of alternatives. • Does not require consideration of • Because most projects are unique,
 alternatives, but can suggest them. alternatives are not well known.
 • Can consider compensating actions
 that are not part of an alternative.
 Clarification for the Decision Maker • Focuses on essential differences. • Can point out whether analysis of • The public nature of decisions and
 • Forces a decision maker to consider criteria is consistent with "gut" choice the possiblity of litigation require the
 alternatives. between alternatives. decision maker to reach a justifiable
 • Because the method does not provide decision,
 a final decision, decision makers may
 not necessarily see the implication of
 their evaluation of criteria.
 Finding Compromises • Searches for alternative options, • Does not include compromise as an • Multiple stakeholders participate in
 including possible compromises. integral part of method, but does allow public decisions.
 for trade-offs between criteria and,
 thereby, stakeholders.
 Favoring Stakeholder Groups • May encourage wider range of »Requires numeracy, which may • Stakeholder groups may differ widely
 stakeholder participation. disfavor less educated groups. in education, power, and rights.
 • Harder to integrate rights-based
 approach.
 Communication • Provides clear and quick description • Shows detail about how decision • Public has major involvement in
 of the decision problem. maker weighed different criteria and decisions.
 •Focuses discussions by reducing their impact. «Public has low knowledge of
 unnecessary complexity. • Can discuss numbers and alter them. background and issues.
 • Gives permit applicant a template with • Obscuring issues is a potential
 which to work. stakeholder tactic.
 Ability to Reuse • Requires a new approach to analysis • Applies to a class of permitting • Tools can provide a general approach
 for each decision problem. decisions. to unique Arctic issues.
 • Can be used as template for permit • Tools can reduce the cost of ad
 applications. hoc approaches to environmental
 decisions.
 Ease of Use • Is easily understandable. • Requires numeracy. »At some decision-making levels,
 • May require training for decision educational attainment is low.
 maker.
 Incorporating Uncertainty • Considers uncertainty as one criterion. • Asks decision maker for estimate of »The Arctic environment is highly
 • May transform uncertainty to the uncertainty. variable.
 dollar cost of removing it. • Provides overall uncertainty for each • Well-head prices are volatile.
 alternative. • Unexpected costs may arise.
 transportation. Finally, because construction and operation
 often use new techniques, it is difficult to figure accurately
 the cost of any project. Prior experience may not be available
 as a guide. Thus, uncertainty is a key issue.
 Complexity Reduction
 While decisions about oil and gas development in the
 Arctic are often portrayed as a battle between development
 and the environment, the skirmishes take place in several
 arenas. Because development takes place on public land in
 both Russia and the United States, several interest groups are
 usually involved, each of which may have a distinct concern
 or stake - or even more than one. Development, primarily a
 consider tion of economic interests, may concern the com-
 pany carrying out the activity, the local or regional govern-
 ment, or the federal government. All may have an interest in
 seeing the development take place, but with enough differ-
 ences among them, e.g., taxes versus profits, that they cannot
 be considered to have the same interest. Complexity can arise
 fr m defining those differences as aspects of the same na-
 tional interest. Similarly, the environment is not a single
 entity. Development may improve some aspects of the envi-
 ronment, while negatively affecting others. Finally, within
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 the United States, the battle often takes place in a legal forum.
 Delay is a tactic, and creating complexity may be a way to
 increase delay.
 The qualitative approach eliminates much of the complex-
 ity by reducing the question to the bare essential of differ-
 ences. The quantitative method does not reduce the complexity
 per se, but it brings to bear a common denominator. A chief
 issue between the two methods is whether the numbers
 created under the quantitative approach are "real": do they
 truly reflect psychological states in which numerical inter-
 vals are equidistant and values placed on different impacts
 follow a common scale allowing comparison? Both meth-
 ods, each in their way, reduce complexity and thus achieve
 a valuable public goal. This reduction allows both decision
 makers and the general public who have no firsthand
 knowledge of the Arctic to understand what the essential
 issues are.
 Consideration of Alternatives
 The two methods differ considerably in whether they
 force consideration of alternatives. The qualitative ap-
 proach engenders a search for another alternative that has
 not previously been considered. This alternative can be a
 new variant developed by altering the negative features of
 one approach, as seen in the Yamal case, or it can be an
 entirely new method for solving the problem, as in the
 Niakuk case. The quantitative approach, though it can
 consider other alternatives, does not use their creation as
 a tool in the analysis, nor does it force consideration of
 alternatives. Someone looking for alternatives could use
 NDA to locate the largest disadvantages of the existing
 options and try to develop another option based on those
 observations.
 The forcing of alternatives can be important in the Arctic:
 the unique conditions can call for new solutions to engineer-
 ing problems. One example may be the development of freon-
 filled pipeline supports in Alaska. Environmentalists raised
 the concern that the originally proposed buried pipeline, or
 even the supports of a raised pipeline, would cause
 thermokarsts. The development of the supports solved this
 problem, and probably saved the pipeline company consider-
 able repair costs. The forcing of an alternative benefited both
 the environment and the oil industry.
 The quantitative approach, on the other hand, allows the
 consideration of compensating actions. Thus, the analysis
 may point out that a positive impact outweighs a negative one
 in another category. The qualitative approach has no way of
 considering this trade-off, because it does not attempt to
 provide the means to cross-compare criteria unless compari-
 sons can be made in money equivalents. For instance, an
 applicant could propose to replace wetland in the project area
 by creating wetland of equal or greater value in another area.
 Compensating actions may be less feasible in the Arctic
 environment, because slower biological processes would
 lengthen the time needed to create, say, a new wetland or
 other biophysical feature.
 Clarification
 Both methods clarify the decisions. The decision mak-
 ers with whom we worked in both the United States and
Russ a had a similar experience: after the first iteration on
 the model, and after some time to think, they universally
 revised their analyses to reflect what they thought was an
 accurate model. In the quantitative approach, the clarifica-
 tion came when the consequences of the modeling were
 clear. The decision makers saw a result that was counter to
 what they thought was the correct decision. That is, think-
 ing about the individual factors influencing the decision
 did not add up to the decision that a decision maker thought
 correct. The decision maker then had the option of either
 rethinking the individual factors or rethinking the deci-
 sion. By forcing consistency, the decision analysis tech-
 niques can help us avoid many of the decision-making
 pathologies that plague ad hoc decisions.
 The use of numbers in the analysis would add to the clarity
 of a decision when scales are carefully constructed. A nu-
 merical approach also clarifies by not reducing a complex
 question such as the environment to a single factor: it main-
 tains and deals with the multiple elements that make up any
 key area of a decision. However, the quantitative approach is
not likely to lead to clarification, or communication, if the
 people using it, or those to whom it is directed, are not
 numerically sophisticated. The approach worked well with
 decision makers in the Corps of Engineers because they were
trained scientists, but what about people in the small villages
 of Alaska? No a priori assumptions can be made one way or
 the other.
 The non-numerical CDA analysis requires the decision-
 making process to identify and deal with the essential differ-
 ences between different options. That is, clarity is achieved
 by eliminating factors for which there is no real difference or
 which are not important to the decision maker, rather than
 transforming them into numbers as in NDA.
 Finding Compromises
 NDA deals with single decision makers and their choices
 among an existing group of alternatives. As noted under the
 consideration of alternatives, it is possible to develop new
 options from the old options, but they are not part of the
 analysis. NDA does allow clearer trade-offs. CDA, in creat-
 ing a new option when noncomparability exists, allows for
 the consideration of different interests and can try to create a
 compromise option based on an analysis of those interests.
 Aiding compromise reduces the cost of any decision.
Favoring Interests
 NDA could favor certain interest groups over others. First,
 NDA requires greater numeracy, at least on the part of the
 ecision maker. This problem might be overcome with the
 development of graphical prompting techniques. These tech-
 niques would not ask for numerical evaluations, but rather
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 whether a series of boxes captures a decision maker's
 thinking on a decision.
 However, a second problem would be more difficult to
 overcome. The quantitative approach is less able to deal with
 a "rights-based" approach to a particular decision. Under a
 rights-based approach, a group would not be willing to see its
 interests traded off against others because those interests are
 based on a legal right. Small groups within larger societies,
 such as Alaska Natives, typically emphasize this approach
 because they know that they will not necessarily win a
 majority decision. NDA has difficulty dealing with such
 thresholds, as it must add another factor to the analysis
 beyond importance, impact, and uncertainty. CDA can deal
 with it more easily. Taken together, these problems mean that
 NDA may disfavor smaller groups with lower numerical
 skills who must argue from a position of rights.
 Communication
 Both methods may be considered improvements over the
 often confounded discussions surrounding oil and gas devel-
 opment in the Arctic. Simply achieving greater clarity and
 reducing complexity do, to some extent, provide improved
 communication. Decisions are more transparent. The NDA
 approach can present its findings in more graphically inter-
 esting forms because of its numerical base. The research did
 not specifically attempt to measure improvements in commu-
 nication, but other regulators who work with the CoE indi-
 cated that the analyses were improvements.
 Ability to Reuse
 As the American permitting case showed, the NDA
 approach can be applied to a class of decisions. The
 American researchers' tentative conclusion was that some
 variant of the NDA approach would be useful to regulators
 as a required format for industry-submitted construction
 applications or as a format for regulators to follow in
 making and explaining their own permitting decisions.
 (This conclusion needs to be tested in the context of a
 regulatory regime, but such testing was outside the scope
 of this study.) Because a chief characteristic of the CDA
 approach is that it reduces the number of criteria consid-
 ered, it is less generalizable. That is, it must approach each
 decision anew and adapt its analysis accordingly.
 Ease of Use
 The CDA approach is easier to use because it employs
 natural language. The NDA required some learning on the
 part of the decision makers. Setting the scale (the meaning of
 the "100" impact) took considerable discussion, and making
 a judgement along that scale did not come naturally. These
 difficulties were encountered with decision makers who had
 a scientific background and were comfortable with numbers.
 One might well ask whether the difficulties might be even
 greater for people without this kind of background. With the
rural villages of Alaska becoming more involved in impor-
 tant decision making, the analysis method used should be
 a cessible to people less experienced with numbers. Thus,
 CDA may be most appropriate where a decision analyst does
 not have much time to work with the decision maker. NDA
may be easier to work with as the length of time available
 increases.
 Uncert inty
 The approaches deal with uncertainty in very different
 ways. The CDA approach, in the Yamal case, looks at the cost
 of reducing uncertainty. That is, the qualitative approach
 transla es uncertainty into a monetary figure. Even if decision
 mak s decide not to pay that cost, it is not an unknown. A
 public debate can be pursued in which the value of uncer-
 tainty carries a concrete figure.
 The NDA approach may attempt to estimate the amount of
 uncertainty. Here again the decision maker has to be able to
 think in quantitative terms to provide an estimate. The payoff
 is that the analysis can derive a single estimate of uncertainty
 o go with the single estimate of utility . Again, the uncertainty
 can be graphically presented. The public debate entrained by
 t is treatment of uncertainty would cover the estimates given
 by the decision maker.
 In both cases, the response might be to spend money on
research to reduce the uncertainty. Under the CDA approach,
 a permit applicant or a decision maker will have a clear idea
 as to the opportunity cost of not doing the research. That is,
 the analysis can suggest that further research might be justi-
 fied by cost reduction from not having to provide an engineer-
 ing solution to the problem. If, for instance, a model could be
 developed to predict accurately the entrance of icebergs into
 Baydaratskaya Bay, with the result that a ship need be
 stationed in the bay only during those times, the value of the
 research and the maximum suggested cost would be equal to
 the cos  reduction from periodic rather than constant monitor-
 ing. The NDA approach does not give a dol lar cost in the same
 way. It does point out more clearly, however, where the issues
 lie. As uncertainty makes an impact less desirable, an incen-
 tive exists to improve the precision of figures given.
 Institutional Acceptance of the Methodologies
 Initially, CoE decision makers appeared more comfort-
 able with CDA, but they became more accepting of NDA as
 they used it. The CoE has not taken the step of using either
 method as a formal part of its permit application procedure.
 This step would probably require review at levels higher than
 the Alaska District Office Regulatory Branch.
 Two instances of nonacceptance did arise, however,
 during the course of research. In both cases, the people failed
 to understand that the analysis techniques were not intended
 as objective analyses which would support the decision
 makers' own knowledge and thinking. Nor do the methods
 magically transform the decision makers' decision into some-
 thing more robust than it already is. The methods do make
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 subjective decisions more understandable to others and, in
 this respect, make the decisions more public, if not more
 objective.
 CONCLUSIONS
 Decision analysis methods differ in how they address
 Arctic oil and gas issues. These differences suggest that such
 methods can improve oil and gas decision making, rendering
 it clearer both to the public and to the decision maker. Arctic
 resource decisions are public and do need better public
 understanding. These methods therefore suggest that im-
 proved decision analytic methods are an important research
 objective.
 Arguably, Arctic resource decisions are among the most
 thorny environmental issues because of their complexity and
 uncertainty. Methods developed for the Arctic may therefore
 serve well elsewhere. They may also be applied to several
 areas that are not strictly environmental issues, such as
 allocating basic scientific research funds. Arctic oil and gas
 decision makers must think not just about their decisions, but
 about how their decision making might be clarified and
 communicated.
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